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T
he Great Depression (1929–33) was the
most severe economic contraction in
the United States during the twentieth
century (see Figures 1–3). During the
contraction industrial production fell
nearly 50 percent from its prior peak.
The unemployment rate reached 24 percent in
1933: About one in four people in the workforce was
without a job.1 By 1933, the price level was more
than 25 percent below its 1929 level. During the
Great Depression a few contemporary analysts and
economists were critical of Federal Reserve policies
(see Currie 1934; Warburton 1945; Burgess 1946).
But the prevailing view at that time held that there
was little that Federal Reserve monetary policy could
have done to moderate the severe contraction (see
Box 1 on page 6). 
Economists continue to investigate the hypothet-
ical causes of the Great Depression in empirical
research, and the culpability of Federal Reserve
policies remains an unsettled issue. Two leading
aggregate explanations for the Great Depression are
distinguished by whether or not they point to the
Federal Reserve System and its monetary policies as
mainly responsible for the propagation and magnifi-
cation of the initial contraction into a depression. 
This article is a selective survey of recent macro-
economic modeling efforts and empirical work
that examine aggregate explanations for the Great
Depression. The discussion maintains a sharp dis-
tinction between the evidence for each side—the
case for a monetary cause of the Great Depression
versus an alternative view in which monetary policy
instead appears to respond to (rather than cause) a
severe contraction. From the voluminous literature
using vector autoregression (VAR) techniques, the
empirical results offer no consensus that monetary
policy was the main cause of the Great Depression.
Empirical results from the more recent, sparser liter-
ature using dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
(DSGE) modeling also reveal no consensus that
monetary policy caused the Great Depression.2
Each empirical literature requires sufficient
structure of the economic model to isolate mone-
tary policy disturbances, and structure requires
certain assumptions. Monetary policies, in general,
are actions by the monetary authority associated
with the adjustment of money supply as distinct from
money demand responses (changes in monetary
measures that take place in response to economic
activity). A monetary policy disturbance arises from
an action by the monetary authority that deviates
from the model-specified monetary policy reaction
function, which identifies and distinguishes between
money supply and money demand. The empirical
research differs on whether the identified measure
of monetary policy initiates the economic contraction
or, if the measure does not initiate the contraction,
whether monetary policy measures play a crucial
role in explaining the magnitude of the real output
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Source: National Industrial Conference Board, Business Cycle Indicators, vol. 2 (April 1929–June 1942, pp. 35, 123), NBER series no.
08292, NBER Macrohistory Database1. In contrast, during the post–World War II period, the highest unemployment rate observed was about 11 percent (December
1982), and the average “peak” unemployment rate is 6.2 percent (one in sixteen people in the labor force out of work). Note
that unemployment rates may continue to rise after the declared end of a recession.
2. VAR models are statistical time-series models that emphasize the correlations in the data to describe economic dynamics.
DSGE models are theory-based models that rely on the behavior of households, firms, intermediaries, and the government,
which restricts the dynamics of the economy. Robertson and Tallman (1999) and Del Negro and Schorfheide (2003) provide
accessible introductions and reviews of these tools.
3. A bank intermediates between its depositors, who may leave relatively small balances on deposit at the bank, and its borrowers,
to whom the bank issues loans from the proceeds of accepting deposits.
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contraction. In each literature, identifications of
monetary policy vary in their ability to capture
important institutional features of the banking and
financial system and how monetary policy, as prac-
ticed at that time, affected them. Further refining
the propagation and transmission mechanism of
monetary policy to the real economy and isolating
the key initial shocks will deepen our understanding
of how the Great Depression happened and how
such catastrophes can be avoided.
A Motivating Example: 
Data Speaking in Tongues
D
ifficulties in evaluating competing explanations
of the Great Depression arise because data
alone are insufficient to distinguish the importance
of monetary policy during that period. Figure 4 dis-
plays the M2 monetary aggregate, the combination
of currency and demand deposits, measured
monthly over the 1926–35 period. The contraction
in M2 occurs more than a year later than the down-
turn in either the industrial production index or in
the price level (aside from the brief sharp vacilla-
tions in September and October 1929). By late 1930,
depositors were making widespread withdrawals
from bank demand deposit accounts—that is,
demand deposits were converted into currency on
a large scale. Figure 5 shows the ratio of M2 to the
monetary base (currency plus bank reserves)—a ratio
called the money multiplier—measured monthly
over the 1926–35 period. The money multiplier indi-
cates the level of bank intermediation activity.3 As
an indicator of bank intermediation between bor-
rowers and savers (depositors), the multiplier fell
dramatically during the Great Depression and fell at
































The Price Level Measured by the Implicit GNP Deflator



















































































Source: Friedman and Schwartz (1970)4. Bernanke (2002) discusses identification generally and in the context of the Great Depression.
5. The shocks included the residual financial effects of World War 1 on sovereign nations, the restrictions of the gold standard,
misapplication of the real bills doctrine at the Federal Reserve, agricultural problems in the United States, reparations indebt-
edness of the war’s losing forces, and others.
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From a cursory examination of Figures 4 and 5,
one might conclude that the monetary authority is
not responsible for the Great Depression because
the contraction in the real economy (industrial pro-
duction, the increase in unemployment) preceded
any notable contraction in monetary aggregates. But
the vindication of the Fed in this simplistic argument
has flaws. Figure 6 compares two nominal interest
rate series—the call money interest rate and the
interest rate on discount window loans from the
Federal Reserve Banks. If these interest rates indi-
cate monetary policy actions, then discount rate
increases between January 1928 and August 1929
suggest that Federal Reserve policies restricted con-
ditions in the financial markets and the real economy
prior to the October 1929 stock market crash. The
interest rate on money borrowed on call at the New
York Stock Exchange (the call money interest rate)
was above the discount rate from January 1928 until
October 1929. The Federal Reserve implemented
policies in 1928 aimed at limiting loans for “specula-
tive” purposes, of which call loans were the chief
form (see Wicker 1966). These policies may have
influenced the increase in the call rate, thereby
helping to precipitate the real and financial contrac-
tion at the start of the Great Depression. The vindi-
cation is therefore not clear-cut.
Examinations of the data series alone are unable
to distinguish unambiguously between competing
models or theories. The graphical display of mone-
tary and real economic data does not characterize
monetary policy—that is, what the Fed had been
doing systematically through the 1920s in response
to its key operational objectives. These ambiguities
highlight the problems surrounding the identifica-
tion of monetary policy and the identification prob-
lem more generally (see Box 2 on page 8).4
It is perhaps too much to ask that a single source
by itself explains the economic contraction. Recent
work by Eichengreen (2004) and Meltzer (2004)
offers several sources, both real and nominal, of neg-
ative economic shocks and institutional rigidities
contributing to the economic collapse.5 Bernanke












Call money interest rate
Discount rate
FIGURE 6
Short-Term Nominal Interest Rates
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Banking and Monetary Statistics, 1914–1941 (1943). The call money interest
rate is the average rate on stock exchange call loans, new (Table 120, 450–51); the discount rate is the rate at the Federal Reserve Bank
of New York (Table 115, 440–42).6 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Third Quarter 2004
I
n the 1920s and 1930s, Federal Reserve System
monetary policies reflected then-popular mon-
etary theories—mainly, a misapplication of the
real bills doctrine to monetary policy. The real
bills doctrine implied that the nominal quantity
of credit outstanding (namely, bank loans or the
liability counterpart, bank deposits) responded
endogenously to the “needs of business and indus-
try.”1 Prevailing wisdom in the 1930s argued that
the Great Depression reflected mainly real eco-
nomic phenomena and that rapid liquidation of
failed businesses would speed recovery. Textbook
descriptions of that economic consensus were
less concerned with monetary factors. Robertson
(1964) refers to a Schumpeterian perspective—
that innovation and the movement toward mass
production increased the productivity of the econ-
omy so rapidly that the economy could not absorb
the additional output. Separately, banking issues
were offered as a secondary effect of—an endoge-
nous response to—the weakened economy. In
addition, Robertson suggests that Fed policy had
little to do with inducing the contraction although
the Fed exacerbated the Great Depression through
“idiotic” monetary policies.
Wheelock (1991) examines Fed monetary pol-
icy during the Great Depression and suggests that
it was more restrictive than policy in the 1920s. At
the same time, he shows that the 1930s’ monetary
policy was consistent with an inadequate operating
policy—that is, the Fed was inferring the degree
of tightness in monetary conditions from the level
of reserve borrowings at the discount window
without sufficient regard to the level of the dis-
count rate relative to other short-term interest
rates. When demand for discount window loans
fell dramatically during 1930, the alarms should
have gone off at the Fed. Instead, the existing
policy framework led to an improper inference—
given no demand for discount window loans, then
the reserves market must have been flush—with-
out regard to the price (the discount rate).
Some researchers have argued that the quan-
tity theory of money was not developed suffi-
ciently to inform Fed policymakers at the time of
the Great Depression—that analysis as found in
Friedman and Schwartz (1963) would have been
too revolutionary (see Steindl 1995 and Wicker
1999, countered by Humphrey 2001). Although in
the minority at the time, Currie (1934) argues
that the lack of explicit attention to the behavior
of the aggregate money supply was a key failure
in Fed deliberations at that time. Although the
reasons behind their respective policy recom-
mendations may differ, Wicker (1996), Wheelock
(1992), Bordo, Choudhri, and Schwartz (2002),
and many others join in support of earlier critics
(Currie 1934; Warburton 1945; Friedman and
Schwartz 1963) that Fed monetary policy should
have aggressively expanded the monetary base
to support economic stability. Whether or not
that policy could have affected the money sup-
ply (implicitly, demand deposit) growth rate to
a significant degree remains uncertain. Empirical
research often imposed strong assumptions about
how base money growth would affect the money
multiplier, implicitly assuming that base money
growth would stem widespread withdrawals of
deposits from banks and the observed bank fail-
ures. Still, the money supply and its apparent lack
of growth during the Great Depression should
have alarmed Federal Reserve officials and
prompted more drastic monetary base expansion,
and it is unlikely that Fed provision of additional
reserves would have worsened bank runs. There
are limits, however, to the Federal Reserve
System balance sheet, especially at that time
given the short existence of the institution and
the lack of explicitly legislated procedures to
recapitalize the Fed—the system or individual
district banks—if the system became insolvent.
Sims (1998) (discussed on page 16) may be refer-
ring to the fiscal implications of Federal Reserve
monetary actions that could have put their balance
sheet at risk of insolvency, or at least illiquidity.
Addressing the fiscal ramifications of these mon-
etary policy choices in an economic model remains
a challenging research topic.
BOX 1
What Did They Know, and When Did They Know It?
1. Some modern economic theories of business cycles have similar implications. For example, the idea that the credit needs
of the real economy will be satisfied passively by financial intermediaries is consistent with an early real business cycle
model (King and Plosser 1984).6. Schwartz (1981) argues that the Fed initiated the contraction; Gordon and Wilcox (1981) argue that Friedman and Schwartz
(1963) were unsure of the Fed’s role as initiator of the contraction but were convinced that inappropriate Fed monetary
policies magnified the contraction.
7. See Currie (1934) and Warburton (1945) for comparable arguments.
8. See Romer (1993) for a contrary perspective; also see Romer (1992).
7 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Third Quarter 2004
Great Depression as “a complicated event” that
came out of the complex economic and political
aftermath of World War I. But even in a research
environment evolving toward consensus, the notable
differences of opinion motivate a relentless search
for more concrete evidence. The research appears
focused on finding the key underlying sources and
understanding with greater clarity the propagation
mechanism (or how the Great Depression snow-
balled from mild recession to calamitous contrac-
tion). Ongoing empirical efforts keep the debates
lively among economic historians as well as macro-
economists. Sharper characterization of the propaga-
tion mechanism likely will center on the specification




he debate over whether the depth and length of
the Great Depression was largely due to mone-
tary policy errors took center stage long after the
subsequent economic recovery.
The contrasting views were brought to the
forefront by Friedman and Schwartz (1963), who
argued that monetary forces magnified the Great
Depression, and Temin (1976), who proposed that
unfavorable real economic shocks were mainly the
cause. For most macroeconomists, these two lead-
ing aggregate explanations for the Great Depression
differ largely with respect to whether Federal
Reserve System monetary policies were mainly
responsible for the severe economic contraction.
The distinction drawn in the discussion that follows
is sharp in order to make the separate explanations
more distinguishable. So far, the empirical literature
has been unable to settle this debate although
proponents on either side likely consider such an
ambiguous conclusion controversial.
Friedman and Schwartz (1963) propose a mon-
etary explanation for the severity of the Great
Depression, placing much responsibility upon the
Federal Reserve’s ineffective monetary policies. In
this view, the monetary authority (the Fed) failed
to supply sufficient liquidity in the form of bank
reserves and currency during the initial contraction
as well as throughout the Great Depression. Without
that liquidity, banks were unable to maintain loan
activity, thereby allowing the initial economic down-
turn to magnify by causing large-scale contraction
of bank balance sheets and thus leading to sharp
increases in observed bank failures and the pre-
cipitous drop in the price level. The assumption
underlying this view is that the resulting credit
contraction and the associated breakdown in the
intermediation process magnified the initial down-
turn and turned it into a depression.6
The monetary explanation of the Great Depression
was not new, but the data, rigorous scholarship, and
exhaustive research presented by Friedman and
Schwartz brought renewed vigor to the arguments
and combined to challenge most other explanations.7
The main alternative explanation, presented in
Temin (1976), suggests that the Great Depression
can be explained as a large negative shock to aggre-
gate demand. Like Friedman and Schwartz, the
aggregate demand view had antecedents and was
consistent with an earlier, dominant view that mon-
etary factors were not essential elements in expla-
nations of the Great Depression. Temin argues that
money supply growth and real output are largely
jointly determined so that the observed decline in
money growth may reflect underlying forces that
affect both real output/income and money growth.
Notably, Temin concentrates attention on interest
rates for indications of monetary policy intervention.
Hamilton (1987) presents evidence suggesting
that monetary authority actions in 1927 and 1928
especially led to the contraction in real output at
the onset of the Great Depression.8 The empirical
evidence links monetary-influenced data (interest
rates, bank reserves, “high-powered” money) with
subsequent real output contractions. The research,
using interest rates in addition to monetary aggre-
gates as an indicator for monetary policy, provides
Economists continue to investigate the hypothet-
ical causes of the Great Depression in empirical
research, and the culpability of Federal Reserve
policies remains an unsettled issue.8 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Third Quarter 2004
E
mpirical research surveyed in this review
shares a number of common elements, yet,
despite common elements, the studies present
divergent conclusions about the role of monetary
factors in explaining the Great Depression. In the
VAR-based research, the conflicting results and
conclusions arise from the different restrictions,
including differences in the included data series,
lag length restrictions, Bayesian prior restric-
tions, and the imposition of exclusion restrictions
that limit the contemporaneous interactions
among the variables in the system. These latter
restrictions are often described as identification
restrictions that allow the modeler to isolate an
association between what the model estimates to
be unpredictable movements in the data series
(reduced form errors) and what may be inter-
preted as the underlying source of uncertainty in
the model—shocks that can be given a more eco-
nomic interpretation.
Researchers want to use identification restric-
tions that arise from structural specifications
motivated from economic theory and to deter-
mine whether underlying shocks to monetary pol-
icy generate economically plausible results. An
economically rigorous conclusion requires that
researchers design a structural economic model
in which monetary policy actions have money
supply–based interpretations as distinct from a
money demand source. The model implies a mon-
etary policy function and thereby isolates how
monetary policy affects aggregate economic out-
comes (for real output, prices, employment, and
so on), both actions being crucial for making
inferences about monetary policy’s role in the
Great Depression. Depending on the theoretical
assumptions that underlie the research, sharp
changes in monetary and banking aggregates may
have been caused by monetary policy, or they
may have been instead the symptoms of the real
output contraction. The discipline of a structural
model allows researchers to see explicitly the
importance of concrete assumptions—such as,
for example, the economic measures that the
monetary authority is assumed to use in setting
monetary policy (its policy reaction function). 
These assumptions are often crucial for the
interpretation of the results. Researchers can
assess the econometric results and, by altering
the assumptions, can determine whether the
inferences change if these assumptions are
changed. For example, economic theory suggests
that any contractionary monetary policy shock
would produce an increase in the nominal inter-
est rate and a contraction in the monetary aggre-
gate. Also, that shock would, other things being
equal, reduce output. In this survey, the identifi-
cation restrictions in the empirical VAR analyses
typically employ just-identified models—that is,
there are a variety of alternative specifications
that are equally likely representations of the
reduced-form model. Identifications that are
overidentified provide testable hypotheses and
help distinguish between identifications that fit
the data from those that do not. There may be
instances in which empirical models retain over-
identifying restrictions that have been rejected
by the data because of the strength of the
researcher’s belief in that assumption. 
So far, few researchers have settled on one
universally accepted specification of the mone-
tary policy function, and the long-standing debate
regarding the role of monetary factors in the
Great Depression continues. Similarly, there is
ongoing research in macroeconomic theory to
characterize more realistically the role of finan-
cial intermediation for real economic decisions.
Eichengreen’s synthetic consensus view (dis-
cussed on page 9) of the Great Depression may
seem difficult to bring to the data within an empir-
ical model. But several elements of that view
appear amenable to a structural VAR model. In
such a model, an economic structure with a mean-
ingful real shock in a monetary propagation mech-
anism could suggest that real economic shocks
weakened the solvency of the U.S. banking sys-
tem, which then was weakened further by the
restrictive international financial and monetary
structure. The other unstated but ambiguous issue
surrounds whether the real or monetary shocks
determined the subsequent deflationary path or
whether that path was an additional outcome
arising from the international monetary standard.
Identifying a mechanism in a VAR to uncover
potentially informative effects from these paths
remains a challenge for further research.
BOX 2
Identification Restrictions9. Ohanian (1999) suggests that analysis of the Great Depression should help economists understand why bad policy choices are
implemented in crisis situations and thereby help prevent such choices in future. See also Bordo, Erceg, and Evans (2000).
10. In the final line of the abstract Eichengreen writes, “For the United States, there is no denying the role of monetary policy
mistakes in the onset of the Depression, whereas for other countries international monetary instability played the most
important part” (2002).
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support for a monetary source for the economic
contraction. These results make a credible, narra-
tive case supporting the monetary source of the
contraction, and Hamilton points to a variety of
financial measures that indicate a notable change in
monetary policies prior to the Great Depression. The
research provides a simple model for a monetary
policy reaction function, describes a mechanism for
transmitting monetary policy changes to the real
economy, and then makes inferences about how the
changes in monetary policies affected key macro-
economic aggregate measures of real activity. The
connection between monetary policy actions and
the effects on the real economy does not arise from
a precisely specified and estimated economic model.
Recent theoretical and empirical approaches to
macroeconomics suggest a less central role for mone-
tary and nominal quantities and have implications for
the debate over the Great Depression that are similar
to Temin’s. Research continues to uncover more pre-
cise evidence of policy ineptness—in fiscal policy
(particularly, regulatory restrictions) as well as mon-
etary policy—and whether real economic phenomena
are sufficient for explaining the severity of the real
output contraction.9 An example of this more recent
research, Cole and Ohanian (2001) apply general
equilibrium modeling tools to their analysis, in which
banking and monetary shocks appear less important
for explaining the severe contraction. The refreshing
aspect of this research is that the economic model
does not assume a central role for the monetary and
banking sector as a source of real economic contrac-
tion. Using the same approach, Christiano, Motto, and
Rostagno (2003) develop a model in which mone-
tary and banking factors are central for explaining
the outcomes observed during the Great Depression.
Hence, even in a new literature, no consensus exists
regarding whether monetary factors explain the
interwar collapse.
In recent decades, both new empirical techniques
and newly discovered (or created) data have led to
notable advances in the examination of international
data and the experiences of other countries during
the Great Depression as well as the explicit investi-
gation of the gold standard’s role in transmitting the
Great Depression (see Bernanke 1995; Eichengreen
1992, 2004; Eichengreen and Sachs 1985). This
research provides insights into the worldwide con-
ditions (some institutional, such as the effects of the
gold standard, and some political, such as how key
nations failed to follow the rules of the gold stan-
dard) that led to the Great Depression. This broad-
ening literature has pointed out the shortcomings in
our understanding and in the available data. By
answering some questions and linking the answers
together within a coherent international perspec-
tive, these studies contribute toward building a con-
sensus. Eichengreen (2004) concludes that there
may be a growing “synthetic” consensus view that
considers both monetary policy errors and existing
institutional structures—the international monetary
and financial system—as generating and transmit-
ting destabilizing impulses around the world. In the
Eichengreen (2002, 2004) synthetic view, monetary
policy mistakes in the United States provided the
initial international disturbance that then propagated
across nations through the gold standard.10
International evidence helps explain the Great
Depression, and additional cross-country research
should continue to influence empirical research for
some time. But Eichengreen’s “anything approach-
ing consensus” view may not yet be the last word on
the topic. Introducing advances from international
evidence into economic models remains a challenge.
In its current form, the synthetic explanation appears
too inclusive to allow empirical modelers to estimate
and test the predictions in standard economic and
econometric methods.
In both Hamilton and Eichengreen, the research
provides well-reasoned analysis, but only indirect
evidence identifies monetary factors as the source
of the dislocation. More compelling answers to this
question require isolating prospective measures for
the monetary policy disturbance and the relationship
Difficulties in evaluating competing explanations
of the Great Depression arise because data
alone are insufficient to distinguish the impor-
tance of monetary policy during that period.10 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Third Quarter 2004
not the central focus of his paper, Sims’s work initi-
ated what has become a common method of exam-
ining the notorious contraction. Figure 7 presents
the long-term yield on the lowest-rated commercial
bonds from 1926 to 1935. The path highlights the
dramatic increase in the interest rate in 1931, indi-
cating a perception of the rising costs of intermedi-
ation at that time. The pattern of perceived risk
hints at the additional information that the yield
data convey about the Great Depression.13
Burbidge and Harrison (1985) estimate a VAR
of the same four variables as in Sims; their research
aims directly at uncovering how monetary distur-
bances affected real output during the Great
Depression. In raw form, a VAR model estimates a
time series model in which a variable like IP is a lin-
ear function of past observations of IP as well as past
observations of all other variables in the system. To
interpret the results as “structural,” the researchers
must impose restrictions on the model, and it is
helpful if these restrictions have economic implica-
tions. Specifically, one can restrict contemporaneous
correlations of the data, that is, how IP movements
affect (or are affected by) movements in other series
(like monetary aggregates) within the same time
period. In most VAR analyses, restrictions on the
contemporaneous correlations provide the key ingre-
dients for interpretation of the results. In a model
that reflects Temin’s view, contemporaneous move-
ments in monetary aggregates would respond to
contemporaneous real output movements, but not
vice versa; the economic interpretation is that real
output movements do not respond contemporane-
ously to unpredicted monetary movements. In con-
trast, a monetarist model might restrict monetary
aggregate movements to be unresponsive to real
output movements and allow real output to respond
to contemporaneous monetary aggregate move-
ments, thus allowing monetary disturbances to have
a real output effect contemporaneously.
In both Sims (1980) and Burbidge and Harrison
(1985), the identification restrictions impose a
recursive ordering as the structure. In this setting,
movements in a data series that is first in an order-
ing are insensitive to contemporaneous movements
in the variables that follow it in the ordering. The
recursive structure implies an economic intuition;
the isolation of money supply versus money
demand hinges on the inclusion or exclusion of con-
temporaneous variables in the monetary policy–
related equations. The empirical results examine
a selection of potential orderings. One ordering
implies that innovations in M1 precede innovations
in the short-term interest rate (R), the price level
of these measures to key economic aggregates (that
is, a structural economic model) that jointly initi-
ated the economic contraction. Further refining our
understanding of the Great Depression will help us
answer key questions more concretely.11 Our hunch
is that the careful specification of monetary and
banking sectors of the era in a fully specified eco-
nomic model will be an important element in
answering these questions.
Evidence That Monetary Policy Mattered
T
he VAR-based studies of the Great Depression
begin with Sims (1980); the paper compares
the interwar and post–World War II business cycles
with particular focus on the explanatory power of
monetary aggregates for real output movements.
Sims examines two models: a three-variable model
of the monetary aggregate (M1), industrial produc-
tion (IP), and the wholesale price index (WPI) and
a four-variable model of R (a short-term interest rate,
here the four–six month commercial paper rate),
M1, WPI, and IP. The VAR is estimated in logarithms
of the series (except for the interest rate) over the
interwar period (from 1920 to 1941) using twelve lags
of monthly data and a constant term. The empirical
results for both models indicate that innovations to
the monetary aggregate explain over 50 percent of
the forecast error variance of industrial production
at the four-year horizon whether or not the interest
rate variable is included in the VAR. The result refers
to empirical model estimation that uses the entire
data sample, and the empirical evidence supports a
monetary explanation of the Great Depression.12
In his conclusion, Sims questions whether, for the
interwar period, monetary innovations would con-
tinue to explain so much of real output movements
in a larger model that encompasses additional finan-
cial surprises. Such a model would likely isolate a
different estimate of monetary innovations, account-
ing for financial data series like risk spreads, deposits
of suspended banks, and other indicators of inter-
mediary crisis. Although the Great Depression was
Recent theoretical and empirical approaches
to macroeconomics suggest a less central
role for monetary and nominal quantities
and have implications for the debate over
the Great Depression.11 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Third Quarter 2004
(WPI), and then real output (IP). In this structure,
the shock to the monetary aggregate is equivalent
to the residual error from the reduced-form equation.
The innovation in the monetary aggregate incorpo-
rates responses to other variables only through lags.
The innovation in the interest rate reflects that the
interest rate responds contemporaneously to mon-
etary aggregate movements. Similarly, the price level
innovation reflects that the price level responds to
contemporaneous movements in both the monetary
aggregate and the interest rate. Finally, the real
output innovation reflects that the real output
responds to contemporaneous movements in the
monetary aggregate, the interest rate, and the price
level. A second ordering reverses Rand M1. A third
ordering simply moves M1 to the last position so
that no other shock variables respond contempora-
neously to shocks in the monetary aggregate.14 The
recursive VAR identifications do not generate strong
structural interpretations for the money demand
and money supply functions from the first ordering



















Long-Term Bond Yield, Lowest-Rated
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Banking and Monetary Statistics, 1914–1941 (1943, Table 128, 468–71)
11. Examples of such questions are, If monetary policy mistakes were important, then did monetary policy err more by failing
to increase bank reserves through open market purchases, by failing to provide reserves through the discount window, by
reducing the discount rate too slowly, or all of the above? Of course, the central question is then, What monetary policies
could have avoided the Great Depression?
12. Sims contrasts the implications of the interwar period results with the post–World War II sample; in the more recent sample, inno-
vations in the monetary aggregate explain a lower percentage of real output variance when the VAR includes the interest rate.
13. It is notable that the yield spread between the Moody’s Baa bond (in Figure 7) and the long-term Treasury bond (not shown)
follows the pattern in the risky commercial bond.
14. Typically, the innovation in a data series (M1) will have greater power for explaining the variance in other data series in the
model when it (M1) is first in the ordering. The ordering implies identification restrictions, and the identification is “just
identified,” which means that the identification restrictions allow a unique mapping between the “reduced-form” or unre-
stricted parameter estimates and the structural model. However, the just-identified system is indistinguishable from all other
just-identified structures because there are no restrictions implied by the structure on the reduced-form parameters. In this
case, the chosen ordering is as likely to occur as alternative orderings or, more generally, just-identified models. Hence, the
theoretical justification that explains and supports the identification is important, but it is notable that there are few
theoretical models that motivate the choice of a recursive structure. 12 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Third Quarter 2004
among the data series—that is, a persistent, long-
run relationship between the data series. In that
story, the cointegrating relationship is a standard
money demand function that includes both an inter-
est rate term and a real output term.
mt – pt = α0 + α1yt + α2rt+ vt,
where α represents a parameter, m  is the log of
money, p is the log of the price level, y is the log of
output, r is the nominal interest rate, and v is the
error term.
Bordo, Choudhri, and Schwartz (1995) examine
the counterfactual question, “Could stable money
growth have averted the Great Depression?” The
authors display counterfactual simulations of this
small econometric model estimated over the sam-
ple period that includes the Great Depression.
One simulation assumes a stable money demand
function throughout the full estimation sample
and enforces only that the money growth rate is a
mean growth rate and a monetary shock insensi-
tive to past variations in the other series. The
results indicate that holding the money growth
rate to an average estimated from 1929 to 1933
moderates the loss in real economic activity by
about one-third, which is still a contraction of
Great Depression magnitude. Further restricting
the money growth process by shutting off the
monetary shock reduces the contraction notably.
Under the assumption that M2 money growth is
fully determined by Fed policy, their empirical
model suggests that, had the Fed maintained a
stable growth rate of money, then the contraction
in real output and the fall in the price level would
have been muted during the Great Depression.18
The researchers find strongest support that a
money growth rule would alleviate the huge real
output contraction when they estimate separately
the basic model over two subperiods and use
reduced-form errors from two separate estima-
tions for the model simulations for the whole peri-
od. These results rely on strong restrictions that
are not imposed in the baseline specification and
limit the generality of the inferences.
Several identifying assumptions seem crucial
for generating the findings in Bordo, Choudhri, and
Schwartz, and these key assumptions are not tested.
One critical assumption is the one underlying the
simulations—namely, that money growth can be
controlled directly by Fed policy. The model speci-
fication does not have a banking sector in which
bank deposits may be partly determined by the pri-
The empirical evidence uses historical decompo-
sitions, a procedure that uses model parameter esti-
mates from the entire data sample and makes an
unconditional forecast (for a given forecast horizon)
using only data up to the period prior to the first
forecast period.15 Then, the researcher can estimate
how much of the forecast error can be explained by
each identified shock.16 Burbidge and Harrison sug-
gest that the identification restrictions (that is, the
orderings) have a substantial influence on the esti-
mated role of money in explaining the behavior of
real output and prices over the Great Depression.
When the monetary aggregate is first in the recur-
sive ordering, the addition of the monetary aggre-
gate improves the forecast for the WPI price level
and the IP output measure more than if the mone-
tary aggregate is placed last in the ordering. In other
words, if the innovation in the monetary aggregate
(the model forecast error) is assumed to reflect best
the money supply disturbance, then the VAR model
suggests that monetary disturbances explain much
of the subsequent decline in real output. 
The overall conclusions favor a measurable role
for monetary disturbances in the explanation of the
declines in both real output and the price level dur-
ing the Great Depression in general. For the initial
contraction (1929 to 1931), the authors find that the
baseline model forecast improves little when errors
associated with the monetary aggregate are added.
Hence, the results suggest that monetary factors in
this model cannot help explain the decline in real
output from 1929 to 1931 (see Burbidge and Harrison
1985, 52). Still, the evidence supports the idea that
monetary mistakes magnified the real output con-
traction in 1932 and after.
Bordo, Choudhri, and Schwartz (1995) estimate a
vector error correction model (VECM) using quar-
terly data from 1921:Q1 to 1941:Q4 for three vari-
ables—real gross domestic product (GDP), the
implicit GDP deflator, and the M2 monetary aggre-
gate.17 A VECM is a time-series model similar to a
VAR that explicitly accounts for cointegration
International evidence helps explain the
Great Depression, and additional cross-
country research should continue to influ-
ence empirical research for some time.15. Note that the forecasting model employs coefficient values estimated from the full-estimation sample, an inherent tension
with the goal of the forecast experiment. However, the procedure allows the model to assign explanatory power to the
subsequent forecast error associated with each variable in the system. 
16. The procedure sequentially adds observed, in-sample forecast errors for each variable in the system until the forecast matches
the actual data series.
17. The researchers also introduce a rate of interest measure and a proxy measure for financial fragility by introducing the dif-
ference in the logarithm of the ratio of deposits in suspended banks to total deposits. These measures are offered in variations
of the basic specification.
18. Evans (1997) finds evidence that supports the claim that consistent money growth through the Great Depression would
have alleviated much of the real contraction during that period.
19. Calomiris (1993, 73–75) explains this point in detail, providing a comprehensive summary of the key debates about the role
of financial and intermediation shocks in explaining the Great Depression. 
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vate sector. Federal Reserve notes (currency) and
bank reserves are liabilities of the Federal Reserve
System. Currency, specie, and bank deposits make
up the M2 monetary aggregate. A major portion of
M2 is “inside” money (time and demand deposits in
the banking system) that is not ultimately a claim
on the Federal Reserve System and instead reflects
debt and loan contracts between private sector
entities. Observed movements in deposit aggre-
gates may have more to do with disturbances in pri-
vate sector activity and could have been largely
responding to price level and real output move-
ments on the quarterly frequency.
During the Great Depression, movements in
bank deposits were the dominant source of mone-
tary aggregate movements. Figure 8 shows that the
currency component of M2 behaves differently from
bank deposits over this period. The deposit compo-
nent may respond to changes in the currency stock,
bank reserves, and the amount of currency that the
private market demands. However, monetary policy
controlled only the supply of the sum of currency
and bank reserves; market forces determined the
relative proportions. As bank runs persisted
throughout the early 1930s, the composition of M2
reflected the public’s growing aversion to holding
bank deposits. It remains unclear how Federal
Reserve policies would have alleviated this aversion
unequivocally.19 In addition, bank failures and the
























































































Demand Deposits versus Currency
Source: Friedman and Schwartz (1970)14 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Third Quarter 2004
effects of shocks associated with it.21 The empirical
application may have overextended standard VAR
procedures, using eight variables, estimating several
simultaneous coefficients in the identification, and
including a moving average variance of stock prices.
Although the VAR introduces additional financial
data to fortify the financial sector, the money demand
and supply functions include unusual contempora-
neous relationships with variables, such as real
deposits in failing banks, stock price volatility, and
real liabilities of failed nonfinancial businesses. The
estimation and interpretation of these functions are
debatable, thereby leaving research opportunities
to reinforce and extend these findings. Still, the
conclusions from the research anticipate and are
consistent with later empirical research using addi-
tional econometric procedures.
Cecchetti and Karras (1994) investigate the key
causes for the depth and the persistence of the
Great Depression. The paper employs three differ-
ent structural specifications, each using alternative
identification methods in an attempt to isolate mon-
etary sources of the real contraction from other
sources. One identification method associated with
Blanchard and Quah (1989) imposes restrictions on
the long-run properties of a model that includes real
output, prices, and the nominal interest rate. In this
special handling relative to withdrawal of deposits
from the banking system. Further research on mod-
els with fully specified money demand functions
that examine the stability of the functions over the
entire interwar period appears warranted.
Fackler and Parker (1994) employ an eight-variable
structural VAR that includes a variety of data series
relatively underutilized in the empirical literature
for the interwar period. For instance, the deposits
of failed banks, the liabilities of failed nonfinancial
businesses (Figure 9), and changes in the moving
variance of the Standard and Poor’s stock index are
useful indicators of the degree of financial distress.20
The authors emphasize financial fragility—the
breakdown in the intermediation process facilitated
by financial markets and the banking system—as an
explanation for the Great Depression as distinct from
the monetary policy mistakes view. Their results
indicate that an autonomous demand shock likely
initiated the real output contraction, that monetary
disturbances exacerbated the contraction starting
in 1931 or so, and that a nonmonetary financial
intermediation shock explained some of the early
contraction and most of the positive real output
response to the bank holiday in March 1933. 
Their model uses a number of simultaneous equa-








































Real Liabilities of Failed Nonfinancial Businesses
Source: Dun’s Liabilities of Failed Nonfinancial Businesses deflated with the wholesale price index, 1957–59 = 1.020. See Coe (2002), described below. Notably, Coe’s estimates suggest that the most sustained periods of financial distress occur
after March 1931.
21. Fackler and Parker may face the concern of “weak instruments” for methods to estimate the parameters in simultaneous spec-
ifications of VAR structural error, noted by Pagan and Robertson (1998). See footnote 24 for a more extensive discussion.
22. See Galí (1992) for another example of an identification that combines long-run restrictions and contemporaneous restrictions.
23. Eichengreen (2004) notes that the authors rule out any concern for a speculative attack on the gold reserves in their model.
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setting, shocks associated with aggregate demand
are assumed to be temporary, whereas supply shocks
(for example, those that have durable effects on the
factors of production) have permanent effects. Still,
uncertainty exists about how well the identification
can isolate monetary shocks because that sector is
measured only by an interest rate. Shocks referred
to as aggregate supply and aggregate demand may
also reflect monetary-based shocks that are not
captured by interest rate innovations. A separate
specification attempts to isolate labor supply from
technological shocks to specify further the aggregate
supply. An alternative model attempts to isolate
monetary shocks from the other shocks using an
innovative identification scheme within a model of
real output, the nominal interest rate, the real inter-
est rate, and real M2.22 The model tries to separate
aggregate demand shocks from money supply shocks
to account for the role of monetary policy errors.
The paper concludes that monetary disturbances
were important for explaining the severe and lengthy
output contraction, but the initial downturn was
mainly driven by a sharp contraction in aggregate
demand less associated with monetary disturbances.
Cecchetti and Karras, like Fackler and Parker,
also find that monetary shocks alone are insufficient
to explain the Great Depression although mone-
tary factors are important for magnifying the ini-
tial contraction. In both cases, however, the iden-
tification of monetary policy is relatively unusual.
In Cecchetti and Karras, the variables in the money
demand and money supply functions appear insuf-
ficient to isolate monetary policy shocks. In con-
trast, Fackler and Parker add to the money demand
and supply functions variables that make it diffi-
cult to interpret the resulting shocks. More precise
characterizations of monetary policy and analysis
of the transmission mechanism of monetary shocks
to real output contractions are opportunities for
further research.
Bordo, Choudhri, and Schwartz (2002) specify
an overidentified structural model in which simula-
tions suggest that the gold standard would not have
been threatened by expansionary open market mon-
etary policies that the Fed failed to pursue. This
paper and Hsieh and Romer (2001) offer evidence
to refute the argument in Eichengreen (1992) that
the Fed perceived its gold reserves position as a
constraint on its monetary policy. In Bordo, Choudhri,
and Schwartz (2002), the specification of the mon-
etary process focuses on the determination of high-
powered money (base money) rather than on the
monetary aggregate. High-powered money is the
quantity that the Fed influences directly, and the
paper focuses on a central institutional question
that likely influenced operational decisions during the
Depression. However, the simulation results require
explicit assumptions regarding a counterfactual path
for the money multiplier (how high-powered money
translates to the M2 aggregate) in order for the
counterfactual base growth to affect the monetary
aggregate.23 It is possible that more appropriate Fed
monetary policies might have kept the money mul-
tiplier from falling so precipitously in 1931, but it is
far from certain. The determination of the money
multiplier is a central issue in empirical research on
the Great Depression and remains an opportunity
for further research on the transmission mechanism
as well as on the financial intermediation process
more generally.
From a new literature, Bordo, Erceg, and Evans
(2000) employ a DSGE model with sticky wages
(that is, wages that adjust only slowly to market
forces) to investigate the Great Depression. The
specification of the real economy can account for
such nominal frictions to evaluate the role of these
frictions in the extent and duration of the contrac-
tion. Their findings suggest that the main explana-
tion for the decline in output was ineffective and
inappropriate monetary policy. Yet the model spec-
ifies a simple financial sector. There is no inside
money creation, and the money shock measure is
As bank runs persisted throughout the early
1930s, the composition of M2 reflected the
public’s growing aversion to holding bank
deposits. It remains unclear how Federal
Reserve policies would have alleviated this
aversion unequivocally.16 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Third Quarter 2004
model parameters. The estimated model employs
data from 1919 to 1939 for six time-series—indus-
trial production, the consumer price index, a com-
modity price index, currency, M1, and the discount
rate. In contrast to several earlier VAR papers,
Sims’s paper focuses the identification to isolate
the “structural” shocks of monetary policy by char-
acterizing a policy reaction function using specifi-
cations of Federal Reserve operating policies in
post–World War II data. The application of such a
policy function to the interwar period is anachro-
nistic, and ultimately unrealistic, yet it provides
clearly defined estimates for the supply and demand
functions for money. 
The structural identification isolates monetary
policy disturbances—that is, changes in monetary
policy behavior that would not have been pre-
dictable—from money demand fluctuations. Notably,
there are estimation complexities that arise from
simultaneous coefficient estimation.24 Other shocks
in the system are less easy to interpret. Sims also
uses a Bayesian prior in which the hyperparameters
effectively smooth out the estimated coefficient val-
ues for the lags in the system.25 The results suggest
that innovations related to monetary policy do not
explain much of the subsequent variation of real
output or in the price level. Instead, real output and
price fluctuations are explained mainly by their own
innovations, consistent with the idea that the econ-
omy was subject to substantial shocks aside from
monetary policy during the Depression. 
Notably, Sims does not infer from these results
that monetary policy had little effect on real output
and the price level. Rather, he indicates that the
measure of monetary policy included in his model
may not be sufficient to capture monetary policy’s
effects on the solvency of the banking system or to
measure the impact of bank solvency regardless of
monetary policy influence.26 In other words, some
important effects of the banking system on real out-
put and the price level are not addressed in his
VAR. This conclusion hints at an intuition offered by
Bernanke (1983) that nonmonetary factors, such as
a breakdown in financial intermediation, of which
bank intermediation is a crucial component, may
underlie some of the evidence supporting monetary
causes for the Great Depression.
Coe (2002) has investigated further the idea of
a separate role for financial fragility. Coe isolates an
estimate of the conditional probability of financial
crisis from two indicators of disruptions in financial
intermediation—the yield spread between the Baa
bond and the comparable-term Treasury bond and
the ratio of currency to deposits. Then the author
simple and stylized. The Federal Reserve System
failed to offset the decline in the money multiplier,
resulting in a loss of confidence in the financial sys-
tem. However, the question is whether the Fed could
have done anything about the money multiplier.
This paper shows that the model results are consis-
tent with a money shock story. But the model has
no explicit transmission mechanism or monetary
and financial sector, and, as a result, the evidence is
only suggestive.
In summary, the evidence from these papers sug-
gesting that inappropriate monetary policies were
the key causes for the Great Depression still leaves
some fertile area for research. For example, more
detailed characterizations of financial intermediation
may help isolate the precise mechanisms whereby
Federal Reserve actions that increase the monetary
base can then affect the behavior of the money mul-
tiplier. Further research on the transmission mech-
anism of monetary policy could help in understanding
whether the counterfactual expansionary policy for
the monetary base would have produced the desired
effects on the growth in demand deposits and total
M2 money supply. However, true believers in the
monetary source of the Great Depression may view
assumptions that Fed policies to increase the mon-
etary base would thereby increase the money multi-
plier as well justified without empirical tests. Among
all these papers, the results support a causative role
of monetary factors, to varying degrees, in the
Great Depression.
Evidence That Monetary Factors 
Were Not Important
S
ims (1998) revisits the topic of his earlier paper
that examines the difference in the relation-
ships between economic performance and mone-
tary policy in the postwar and interwar periods. In
this paper, he exploits advances in identifying VAR
models as well as in applying Bayesian techniques
to estimation in pursuit of more accurate estimates
of model structure and more precise estimates of
The determination of the money multiplier is
a central issue in empirical research on the
Great Depression and remains an opportunity
for further research.24. Simultaneity implies that the same contemporaneous variable appears in two equations or the dependent variable in one
equation (M2) appears in the independent variable equation (the discount rate) and vice versa. See Sims (1986) and
Bernanke (1986). See also Pagan and Robertson (1998) for some of the complications that arise.
25. See Sims and Zha (1998). For a less technical description of the prior, see Robertson and Tallman (1999). These priors tend
to aid models in forecasting and limit the variability of coefficient estimates.
26. Sims may also have concerns that, as the Fed was near the zero bound on nominal interest rates, any activist monetary pol-
icy would have a fiscal dimension. That is, the Fed policies could place the balance sheet of the Fed at risk of substantial
loss, a consideration that may have constrained monetary policy choices and brought a fiscal dimension to monetary policy.
27. Coe does not attempt to address the question of whether monetary factors explain the real contraction.
28. “Out-of-sample” implies estimating the statistical model using data available up to the date when the forecasts are to begin.
Next, the researcher uses that model to forecast a given number of periods beyond the estimation sample. The technique
approximates the real-time process of estimating a forecasting model and then forecasting several periods into the future.
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examines whether the estimated probability of finan-
cial crisis helps explain the behavior of real output in
addition to lags of real output and lags of monetary
aggregate growth. The results suggest that the prob-
ability of financial distress has significant explanatory
power in addition to the other variables.27 Further
research may clarify the mechanisms that relate
financial distress to real output contraction.
Among recent empirical work on the Great
Depression, Ritschl and Woitek (2002) employ a
VAR to uncover the explanatory power of money in
the presence of previously untapped time-series
data. The Great Depression in the United States
was associated with a steep and substantial con-
traction in the manufacturing sector. The authors
estimate a Bayesian VAR that examines whether the
time-series behavior of monetary data is effective
in predicting the sharpness of the real output con-
traction during the Great Depression. The model
includes data on real output (IP), prices (CPI),
wholesale prices (WPI), total reserves (TR), and
nonborrowed reserves (NBR). An alternative model
replaces the monetary measures with the discount
rate (DR) to investigate a specification using the
interest rate as the key mechanism for monetary
transmission. The estimation imposes a Bayesian
prior on the model and employs recursive estima-
tion; that is, the model is estimated using only data
measures dated prior to the forecast period in order
to forecast the contraction in real output. The pro-
cedure is anachronistic, but the experiment uncov-
ers an unusual finding that the monetary variables
(or interest rate measures) are not very useful in
forecasting real output out of sample. 
Next, Ritschl and Woitek use data on residential
building permits along with measures from the steel
industry—shipments of machines, sheet steel pro-
duction, steel ingot production, and the prices of
metal products—to measure whether a VAR model
of these variables can more accurately forecast
the steepness of the real output contraction. The
authors find that the VAR made up of these real
indicators can forecast the degree of output con-
traction effectively even in the out-of-sample set-
ting using a model estimated up to January 1929.28
Figure 10 displays steel ingot production versus
total IP and illustrates the significant comovements
(sheet steel production offers similar insights).
Ritschl and Woitek conclude that the real data
can predict the steepness of the contraction and,
therefore, that the Great Depression may have had
at its core real phenomena driving the degree of con-
traction. In their paper, the main inference appears
overextended. The VAR model forecast from
January 1929 raises interesting issues regarding the
initial shock responses, but prediction accuracy
does not measure fully our understanding of the
economic process. The paper presents a VAR that
exploits a correlation between the aggregate output
measure (IP) and key measures of sectoral output—
steel. At that time, the U.S. automobile industry was
a growth industry, and that industry was pummeled
during the Great Depression. Ritschl and Woitek
show that steel production indicators help predict a
steep decline in output. Still, the forecast does not
indicate the identity of the underlying sources of the
shock that drives the real output contraction. By
forecasting the path of the real output contraction
from what might be called component data series,
the paper uncovers an interesting statistical artifact
that may stimulate further investigations into the
ultimate source of the real shock.
Recently, Cole and Ohanian (2001) approached
the enigma of the Great Depression with an alter-
native perspective—that of the real business cycle
theory. The approach imposes the discipline of gen-
eral equilibrium analysis applied to an aggregate
model, often with minimal frictions. In empirical
implementations, the approach must often find
values or estimates of key model parameters from
other economic studies and impose those parameter
values on the general equilibrium model. The empir-
ical strategy is to examine whether the observations
in key data series are consistent with predictions18 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Third Quarter 2004
that their model cannot explain the observation of
the Great Depression through the contraction in their
stylized banking sector has as much to say about
the adequacy of their modeling framework as it
does about the importance of the banking collapse
as an explanation of the Great Depression. Both the
modeling framework and the banking hypothesis
may need additional features to constitute a satis-
factory explanation. But the progress and attention
in this general equilibrium modeling literature sug-
gest that advances are likely to occur in our under-
standing of the interwar economic collapse.
The differences across the empirical results arise
from selection of the set of variables used in the
estimation, the identification (or overidentification)
of the structure, and the restrictions that are imposed
on the estimation (that is, Bayesian priors). For the
Great Depression, money and other banking mea-
sures influence the estimation of monetary policy
measures, but present specifications are insufficient
to account for the monetary transmission process.
As a result, the empirical results appear inconsis-
tent: Sims (1998) and Ritschl and Woitek (2002)
suggest that real sources were central causes for
the Great Depression, whereas Bordo, Choudhri,
and Schwartz (1995, 2002) show evidence that the
Great Depression was mainly the result of huge
arising from model simulations. In many cases, the
analysis amounts to assessing how closely simulated
data from the model can replicate the statistical
characteristics of observed data series. In their analy-
sis, Cole and Ohanian find that, conditional on their
modeling framework and their calibrated parameter
values, the banking contraction observed during the
Great Depression is not associated with such a
severe contraction in output in their model as was
experienced during the Great Depression. As a result,
they conclude that other sources of shocks should
be investigated to explain the Great Depression in a
general equilibrium setting.
One view of their research is that the general
equilibrium modeling framework is currently too
restrictive and therefore does not mimic closely the
economic mechanisms that the banking system pro-
vides in the actual economy. From this view, Cole
and Ohanian’s model is not close to explaining the
Great Depression. For example, the assumption of a
single representative agent framework may not
allow the model to capture the complex facets of
financial contracts across agents. As a result, when
banking failures take place in the actual economy,
the closure of a bank may produce an inability to
enforce these contracts and may prevent the trans-




































































































































Steel Ingot Production versus Total Industrial Production
Source: Steel ingot production from 1938 Statistical Report of the American Iron and Steel Institute, NBER series no. 01135, NBER
Macrohistory Database; industrial production from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System19 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Third Quarter 2004
monetary mistakes. The modest conclusions of
Sims (1998), along with the provocative findings in
Cecchetti and Karras (1994) and Fackler and
Parker (1994), suggest that detailed specification of
the transmission mechanism may be a productive
path for further research. Ultimately, the empirical
research may lead toward more of a consensus that
the flawed policies of the Fed were largely respon-
sible for the depth and duration of the Great
Depression. New evidence using an estimated VAR
may continue to contribute to the literature, espe-
cially if it embodies more explicit modeling of the
financial sector.
Introducing a Banking Sector into 
the Empirical Models
T
he inclusion of a banking sector into estimated
models may help uncover whether the data are
consistent with the assumed behavior of the money
multiplier. For example, expansionary monetary
policy may increase the growth in the monetary
base (increasing both currency stock and bank
reserves). To raise money supply growth effectively,
the growth in the monetary base must affect the
behavior of borrowers and lenders. Increased mon-
etary base growth reduces the intermediation costs
banks face so that banks increase their loans.
Isolating the effects of Fed policy during the Great
Depression still centers on what caused the con-
traction in bank deposits. The contraction could be
rational banker responses to weakening loan demand,
or it could be that the Fed failed to maintain suffi-
cient growth in the monetary base and inadvertently
increased banks’ costs of intermediation. Research
aimed at detecting the monetary elements of the
Great Depression investigates whether the actions
(or inaction) of the Fed in the reserves market failed
to lower the costs of intermediation sufficiently to
allow banks to maintain the levels of financial activ-
ity consistent with (or in support of) a recovering
economy. Few empirical papers specifically address
this issue, but some recent empirical papers incor-
porate a banking sector more completely.
Recently compiled banking data may help in the
specification of the financial sector and the transmis-
sion mechanism. Anari, Kolari, and Mason (forth-
coming) calculate a data series that accumulates the
deposits of banks that remain in liquidation, essen-
tially assessing the quantitative effects of illiquid
deposits. The data are carefully constructed and
offer insights that differ from those offered by the
typical data series that aggregates the deposits of
suspended banks. The authors note that the key
contribution of their data series is to disentangle
the deposits of failed banks (deposits that were inac-
cessible for long periods of time) from deposits in
banks that were suspended for only a brief time.
For example, all banks were suspended during the
three-day bank holiday in March 1933, but relatively
few were liquidated. Figure 11 displays total bank
deposits versus the deposits-in-suspension series.
The paper employs this new data series in a four-
variable VAR model composed of the industrial pro-
duction index, the wholesale price index, M1, and
the stock of bank deposits in suspension. In addi-
tion, the authors find that the model variables are
cointegrated and so estimate both a VAR and a vec-
tor error correction specification that imposes the
proposed restrictions. The empirical results from
the restricted model (the vector error correction
model) indicate that the stock of deposits in failed
banks in liquidation explains an important portion
of the fluctuations in industrial production, sup-
porting the role for a credit availability indicator
in explaining output dynamics during the Great
Depression. These results suggest that intermedia-
tion frictions that arose from the inaccessibility of
credit and liquidity were important.
In research by Calomiris and Mason (2003a, b),
further investigations in detailed banking data exploit
balance sheet data for individual Federal Reserve
member national banks during the Great Depression.
The authors attempt to uncover whether banking
failures were explained by aggregate liquidity short-
ages or by insolvency due to the real economic
characteristics of the bank balance sheets. The two
papers find the key measurable characteristics that
separate banks that fail from those that survive
mainly in the items on individual bank balance sheets.
That is, bank balance sheet data (individual bank
financial conditions) explain bank failure; this find-
ing is consistent with an explanation that adverse real
economic shocks may have affected some banks
more than others. 
Despite this finding, Calomiris and Mason still
conclude “there can be little doubt” that aggressive
The search for one conclusive empirical study of
the Great Depression is likely futile, akin to the
search for a single source of the contraction.20 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Third Quarter 2004
that return is not contingent on the observation of
current period shocks. This friction allows the
model a mechanism to capture the credit risk faced
by banks during the Great Depression.
The empirical results from this paper suggest
that the monetary factors in the Great Depression
were largely responsible for the depth and length of
the contraction. It is notable that the empirical
techniques have not yet become standard practice.
A criticism of the empirical results is that a large
proportion of the ability to explain the movements
in the actual data series is due to exogenous shocks,
most notably, a shock associated with liquidity pref-
erence. An increase in this shock indicates that
households prefer to hold a higher proportion of
liquid assets as currency as opposed to bank deposits.
In this model, the liquidity preference shock leads
to higher currency holdings, a lower volume of bank
deposits, fewer bank loans, and less investment.
The illustration of bank disintermediation effects
in the model help identify how monetary-related
shocks may affect real variables in a hypothetical
transmission mechanism. In his comments on
Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno, Ohanian (2003)
notes that their paper offers advances to general
equilibrium–based investigations of the Great Depres-
sion and expresses concerns about the substantial
open market operations or the departure from the
gold standard could have avoided the aggregate col-
lapse in 1931–33. It is notable that their empirical
results support the hypothesis that real economic
shocks were the source of bank failure, which con-
flicts with the hypothesis of an aggregate liquidity
source of bank failures in their sample. The strong
conclusion that an alternative Fed policy may have
avoided the aggregate economic collapse in
1931–33 appears to conflict with their own findings
but is consistent with other empirical and historical
research. The comment displays how the view that
Fed policy mistakes were largely to blame for the
magnified contraction in real output has become
accepted among many economic historians.
From an alternative modeling perspective,
Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2003) design a
DSGE model with a sophisticated financial sector
and a more complicated transmission mechanism
for monetary policy along with labor market rigidi-
ties. The model incorporates a mechanism through
which monetary policy can have substantially non-
neutral effects on real output and the price level.
The banks issue consumer deposit accounts from
which the banks hold part as reserves and lend the
rest of the funds to firms. The deposit accounts













































Deposits in suspended banks
FIGURE 11
Bank Deposit Contraction and Deposits in Suspended Banks
Source: Deposits in suspended banks from Anari, Kolari, and Mason (forthcoming); total bank deposits from Friedman and Schwartz (1970)21 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Third Quarter 2004
variability and explanatory power of key exogenous
shocks. More effort on deciphering the sources and
refining estimates of the variability of these shocks
will add to the influence of this new path in research.
Despite criticisms, the modeling strategy brings a
more realistic financial sector with implications that
allow for reasonable monetary non-neutralities,
and the empirical results are in line with the estab-
lished “monetary causes” empirical literature. As
a result, the paper demonstrates further that, like
other empirical literatures, the real business cycle/
DSGE model approach can generate results on both




he empirical literature on the Great Depression
is far from consensus about the source of the
contraction or the quantitative role of monetary
shocks in the real output contraction. The VAR lit-
erature offers evidence both in favor of and in oppo-
sition to a central role for monetary policy among
the causes for the Great Depression. Similarly,
recent work using the real business cycle or DSGE
modeling approach displays a similar lack of con-
sensus regarding Fed culpability for the Great
Depression. The search for one conclusive empiri-
cal study of the Great Depression is likely futile,
akin to the search for a single source of the con-
traction. The “synthetic consensus” offered by
Eichengreen (2002, 2004) may offer a coherent
explanation of the Great Depression using the accu-
mulation of empirical evidence to suggest that the
Great Depression arose from circumstances and
undesirable shocks too complex to capture in
econometric models. Still, ongoing efforts to inno-
vate in both economic theory and in VAR econo-
metric statistical analysis, along with newly con-
structed data series, open up opportunities to suggest
several fertile paths for uncovering useful elements
of the monetary transmission process from that
time period.
The purpose of further study on this most heav-
ily researched period in our economic history is to
clarify our understanding of the sequence of
events—both the unforecastable and exogenous
shocks and the policy errors that followed. A rigor-
ous accounting of the effects on the economy from
each source may help policymakers today evaluate
the risks faced in our current financial structure.
From our vantage point, the most promising path is
a sharper focus on the financial sector and a more
potent specification of the transmission mechanism
of monetary policy along with methods to incorpo-
rate elements of the labor market frictions noted in
other research.
Our view is that the monetary history and analy-
sis of the Great Depression (separate from the VAR
empirical literature) suggest strongly that mone-
tary factors played an important role in magnifying
and extending the painful economic contraction.
The inability of the VAR literature to reliably verify
this insight suggests that the identification of mone-
tary policy during this period remains elusive. Other
research using aggregate economic models along
with in-depth analysis of banking and other financial
intermediaries suggests that models need to account
explicitly for the disruptions in the banking and
financial sectors. Further work to isolate sources of
the monetary disturbance in identifications with
more detailed formulation of the financial and bank-
ing sectors in the monetary transmission mechanism
may contribute to our understanding of interactions
between monetary and real economic factors.22 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Third Quarter 2004
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